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Defi ning modern Chinese culture
K A M  L O U I E
By the start of the twenty-fi rst century, China’s status as a major 
international economic and political power was beyond dispute. China 
now manufactures everything from microchips to motor vehicles, and 
the ‘Made in China’ label is found in all corners of the world.  Along with 
this economic infl uence, China’s role in global political and cultural af-
fairs is becoming both more signifi cant and increasingly visible.  China’s 
hosting of the 2008 Olympics is just one of the more obvious manifesta-
tions of this impact. Chinese cultural products, ideas, customs and habits 
are steadily spreading around the world in the wake of China’s economic 
and political reach. The chapters in this book explore the key domains 
in Chinese culture and reveal the dynamism produced by a formidable 
culture’s interaction with both its own ancient, albeit never static, tradi-
tions and the fl ood of new global cultural infl uences. The connection be-
tween global economic and political weight and the changes in China’s 
cultural realm are complex and profound. To understand contemporary 
China – an absolute necessity if one is to understand the world today – it 
is vital to appreciate the evolution of modern Chinese culture.
Interest in Chinese literature, philosophy, cinema, qigong and other 
cultural artefacts around the world is stronger now than ever before. 
There has been a plethora of books about Chinese culture published 
in anglophone countries and a steady increase in students enrolling in 
courses on Chinese language and civilization. This trend is set to con-
tinue. According to the Chinese Ministry of Education, by the beginning 
of 2007 the number of foreign students studying Chinese had reached 
30 million, and is set to rise to 100 million before 2010. The Chinese gov-
ernment is investing considerable fi nancial and human resources in its 
promotion of Chinese language and culture, best seen in the expansion 
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of the government-sponsored Confucius Institutes, which since the in-
auguration of the scheme in 2004 had grown to 145 by April 2007.1 
Not surprisingly, in tandem with this upsurge of interest in ‘things 
Chinese’, there has also been an assertion of traditional elements, so that 
Chinese culture is projected as a unifying and largely static phenom-
enon with contemporary culture reproducing and modernizing relics 
of China’s historical past. The choice of the title ‘Confucius Institute’ is 
indicative of this homogenizing and backward-looking trend. The name 
itself implies a certain kind of Chinese culture that is to be promoted. 
Confucius’ teaching has for some two thousand years been synonymous 
with the orthodox aspects of Chinese culture, and in that time it has 
been a philosophy that gave the appearance of a unitary way of life in the 
hugely diverse regions of China. Chinese governments have long tend-
ed to lean more towards unity than diversity in their pronouncements 
about China and Chinese culture. Certainly, the current Communist 
Party (CCP) leaders are investing considerable resources in spreading 
this particular take on Chinese culture. 
While most governments and education systems produce narratives 
of fi xed ‘national cultures’, in fact cultures are in a perpetual state of 
change; and in the last hundred years the culture of China has changed 
more fundamentally and rapidly than at any other time in its long past. 
This is what makes modern Chinese culture such a fascinating subject. 
Certainly the contributors to this volume regard Chinese culture as dy-
namic and diverse, and they demonstrate that dynamism and variety in 
their chapters. They show the continued evolution of Chinese culture in 
vastly different directions, driven by internal forces that are in constant 
interaction with infl uences from outside China’s borders. Indeed, the 
notion of ‘Chinese culture’ is so unstable that when I began the project 
of editing this volume, my central problem was to decide precisely 
what constituted modern Chinese culture. I was presented with the par-
adox of trying to pinpoint a phenomenon that was in a constant state of 
fl ux. 
For large parts of the twentieth century, Western thinking on China 
was dominated by a fascination with her past glories such as Confucian 
philosophy and Tang poetry, or with Orientalist horrors such as images 
of Fu Manchu and bound feet. However, in the last few decades, with 
greater ease of travel in and out of Mainland China, such stereotypes have 
been largely dismantled and China’s civilization has been increasingly 
demystifi ed. Current interest focuses upon contemporary trends and is 
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one of the keys to futurology, as China’s vast potential economic power 
is translated into the reshaping of the world’s global political order. Fur-
thermore, academic research on Chinese culture covers topics that span 
the whole spectrum of society, ranging from the uses of museums of lo-
cal folk exhibits to major historical ruins such as Yuanmingyuan, the Old 
Summer Palace which was burned down by British and French troops in 
1860. Given the huge variety of manifestations of Chinese culture, the 
number of potential cultural sites for examination is endless. The six-
teen chapters that follow are therefore not exhaustive, but are grouped 
around signifi cant issues that together aim to give a holistic picture of 
Chinese culture today. Rather than attempting to be comprehensive, we 
have worked on the notion of change, so that all contributors show to 
varying degrees how their subject matter has changed since the begin-
ning of the twentieth century. Why the focus on the twentieth century? 
To answer this question, it is perhaps best to outline our understanding 
of each of the concepts ‘modern’, ‘Chinese’ and ‘culture’. 
Modern
At fi rst glance, the concept ‘modern’ should not present many problems 
since it should really be a matter of defi nition only.  In English, the word 
‘modern’ stems from the Latin ‘modo’, which means ‘recently’ or ‘of late’. 
In the study of European history, however, the ‘recent’ goes a bit further 
back. The start of the modern era is generally fi xed with reference to the 
French Revolution of 1789 and/or the Industrial Revolution of the early 
nineteenth century. ‘Modern culture’ therefore describes a way of life 
that is still practised now, but is distinctly different from that before the 
Industrial Revolution. 
In Chinese historical studies, especially in the periodization favoured 
by the CCP, the term ‘jindai’ (literally the near-generation) is often used 
for ‘modern’. However, this is taken to refer to the period between the 
Sino–British Opium War of 1840–1842, after which relations between 
China and the West became irrevocably enmeshed, and the May Fourth 
Movement of 1919, in which new ideas from Japan and the West were im-
ported and re-evaluated against traditional values. In daily speech, the 
term xiandai, which translates as ‘the period that has just been revealed’, 
is the most common term for ‘modern’. For example, modernization 
translates as ‘xiandaihua’ in Chinese. In historical studies, however, xi-
andai often refers more specifi cally to the decades between 1919 and 1949, 
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when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established. And 1949 
is then taken to mark the beginning of the contemporary ‘dangdai’ (the 
current-generation) era.2
These three historical junctures each have their merits as the point 
of the start of ‘modern China’, but each implies a political position that 
does not necessarily refl ect the actual cultural situation in China.  If we 
are to take a periodization that is defi ned by cultural factors, none of the 
above is suitable – a different schema is required. I argue that it is most 
appropriate to place modern Chinese culture as beginning around 1900. 
While the Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth century saw the increas-
ing military presence of Western powers in China, culturally, the nation 
remained largely unchanged. I will not go into detail here, since in the 
next chapter Peter Zarrow performs an admirable task of providing the 
historical background to the closing years of the nineteenth century. 
However, even when the Europeans were dictating the terms of trade 
after each victorious military encounter with the Chinese, the material 
and mental landscapes of ordinary people remained largely untouched. 
The imperial and other mechanisms of governance, such as the civil 
service examination system, were still in place, and the voices of those 
advocating system-wide political and social change only became audible 
towards the end of that century. 
Similarly, while the ‘May Fourth Movement’ around 1919 produced 
an unprecedented enthusiasm for new ideas, the groundwork had been 
established in the two preceding decades. While the May Fourth Move-
ment gave rise to extremely important intellectual and political trends in 
China, including the birth of the Communist Party, the fi gures who had 
the most infl uence on the young at this time were without doubt late 
nineteenth-century reformists such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, 
whose writings had converted not only the young emperor of the time, 
but also the revolutionaries. In fact, Mao Zedong called himself ‘Kang 
Liang’ for a time to demonstrate his debt to these late Qing thinkers. 
Likewise, the third point often cited as the start of the ‘contemporary’ 
era – the establishment of the PRC in 1949 – does not adequately mark 
the turning point in terms of China’s culture. Chinese society had fun-
damentally changed before 1949, and the CCP’s success was a manifes-
tation of this ‘modern’ transformation rather than the commencement 
of it. Even though the Communist regime claimed to be making a com-
plete break with traditional thought, its history shows clear continuities 
with the immediate and distant past. Moreover, even if we assume that 
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‘modern’ equates to a readiness to engage openly with the world, under 
CCP rule China has only really actively joined the ‘modern’ world with 
the advent of Deng Xiaoping’s open-door policy in the early 1980s. 
There are compelling reasons for taking 1900 as the starting point of 
modern Chinese culture. As stated above, at the end of the nineteenth 
century late Qing reformers such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao were 
already calling for new ways of thinking and government, and this was 
also a time when major thought currents such as Social Darwinism were 
translated into Chinese by fi gures such as Yan Fu. While they advocated 
the introduction of Western thought into China, these men were solidly 
grounded in traditional Chinese learning. This was thus a time when the 
interaction between Chinese and Western ideas fi red the imagination of 
a whole generation. When the May Fourth radicals vigorously promoted 
the twin Western saviours – ‘Mr Science’ and ‘Mr Democracy’ – as idols 
to be emulated by the young, this was done as a deliberate elevation of 
the Western cultural norms that were to replace Chinese standards and 
values. Likewise, the CCP also intended to wipe out all vestiges of feudal 
China, which were to be replaced by Marxism, another Western import. 
Nonetheless, whatever time frame we adopt to limit the scope of  ‘modern 
Chinese culture’, the term still implies something that is based on some-
thing ‘Chinese’.  Indeed, whatever system is adopted, China continued to 
be ‘Chinese’, and despite the increasing modernization in the twentieth 
century, many core traditions continued to characterize the landscape. 
Indeed, had Kang Youwei succeeded in 1898 in his bid to introduce his 
form of ‘original’ Confucianism nationally, the new millennium might 
have seen a Great Commonwealth founded on a Confucian renaissance, 
similar to the modernization programme of the Meiji Restoration in 
Japan. Even though the so-called 100 Days Reform of 1898 did not suc-
ceed, it did mark the beginnings of  ‘modern’ (with hints of Western) 
modes of both thinking and behaving while remaining Chinese.
In addition, in the years immediately before and after 1900, there was 
also a deliberate attempt to evaluate Chinese civilization holistically and 
from a perspective that many intellectuals of the time explicitly consid-
ered ‘modern’. In the last few years of the nineteenth century, reformers 
such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao took a comprehensive and radi-
cal look at Chinese culture in the hope that it could be integrated pro-
ductively into the world.  At the same time, it was only at the start of the 
twentieth century that thinkers began to be concerned about defi ning 
a national identity. As Prasenjit Duara deftly shows in Chapter 3, ideas 
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of nation and Chinese identity were ferociously advocated and debated 
throughout the century. 
While I have stressed the importance of Chinese–Western interaction 
as one aspect of the advent of the modern period in China, Westerniza-
tion does not automatically produce modernity. In many ways, the mod-
ern age became more ‘Chinese’, in the sense that people living in Chinese 
communities became more nationalistic and at times more inward look-
ing. Thus, ironically, the ‘internationalism’ of the twentieth century cre-
ated a self-conscious and sometimes fi ercely expressed nationalism in 
China – from the xenophobic Boxers of 1900 right up to the pathologi-
cally Sinocentric radicals of the Cultural Revolution in the early 1970s 
and the ‘China Can Say “No” ’ crowd of the late 1990s. There were times 
when the Centre could barely hold, such as the warlord period of the 
1920s, and times when central control was strictly enforced, as seen in 
the early Communist period. 
In this volume I have resisted the commonplace custom of dividing 
the twentieth century into ‘modern’ (Republican) and ‘contemporary’ 
(Communist).  While the Nationalist–Communist divide can serve as a 
convenient means of viewing the major political juncture of the twen-
tieth century, in cultural terms the complexities of both eras contain 
elements that are more than just Imperial, Nationalist or Communist. 
Indeed, these descriptors are often confusing or downright mislead-
ing. Modern Chinese culture, as I have argued above, included elements 
from the imperial era. Similarly, some of the most interesting ideas and 
practices of the Communist experiment came from the 1930s and 1940s. 
And the PRC has seen so many changes and diverse practices that it too 
cannot be easily slotted into one homogeneous ‘culture’. As Arif Dirlik 
demonstrates in Chapter 8, the theorizing of, and commentaries upon, 
socialism in China have undergone tremendous changes in the twenti-
eth century, and not always because of utilitarian imperatives of nation-
building. 
Taking the twentieth century and beyond as the modern frame has 
other interesting implications. The extraordinary developments in 
the Chinese world – indeed in the world in general – over the last few 
decades have meant that the new millennium has already witnessed a 
Chinese culture that was unimaginable only a few generations ago. The 
speed with which even the physical landscape is changing is equalled 
only by the psychological transformations that many have had to un-
dergo. This is especially true of the last decade. Liu Kang’s chapter on the 
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phenomenal developments in television and the Internet illustrates the 
degree to which cyber culture has penetrated and transformed the lives 
of ordinary Chinese, particularly the urban young.  The frequent claims 
of a spiritual vacuum by political leaders and public intellectuals are a 
reminder that there is indeed a crisis of recognition. The unrelenting 
and drastic transformations, both physical and mental, have left many 
reeling from a state of future shock.  
Not only has Mainland China changed; its peripheries such as Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Macau are becoming even more varied. Voices advocat-
ing an independent identity are heard from the former, while the latter 
have become more integrated and interdependent with the Mainland. 
The diasporic communities have also transformed beyond recogni-
tion. What were mainly groups from coastal regions of Guangdong and 
Fujian are now joined by people from the interior, speaking dialects that 
the old communities would not have understood. More importantly, the 
‘cultural level’ – to be defi ned more precisely in the section on ‘culture’ 
– of the new diaspora is very different from that of the old. But of course 
there are many things happening now that are still ‘traditional’ and 
‘modern’, and this book in capturing the twentieth century as modern 
does occasionally hark back to ‘traditional’ times, as well as what is hap-
pening in the twenty-fi rst century, to explain ‘modern’ China.
Chinese
While defi ning the term ‘modern’ presents problems, the concept of 
‘Chinese’ is even more diffi cult to pin down.  In English, the word ‘China’ 
seems to have derived from the Qin (pronounced ‘chin’) Dynasty (221–
206 BC), the fi rst Chinese dynasty in which the various states that had 
previously existed were unifi ed as one Chinese empire. This was also the 
period during which indirect contacts were made between the Chinese 
and Roman empires by way of the silk route. In Chinese, ‘China’ (Zhong-
guo) literally means the Middle Kingdom (or centring nation, if the idea 
of the emperor or capital city being a magnetic centre is accepted), giving 
rise to Sino-centric sentiments among many Chinese. Of course, over the 
centuries, the ‘centre’ of the country shifted, most often along the Yellow 
River in the north or the Yangtze River in the south. Nevertheless, for 
millennia, the Chinese empire referred to the geographical area covering 
regions around these two rivers. Within this area, myriad and dissimi-
lar groups of peoples, languages and ways of life existed and continue 
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to exist. Yet these groups all describe themselves as Chinese, in the same 
way that the large variety of peoples and entities in Europe call them-
selves European. To make matters even more complicated, just as ‘Euro-
pean’ can describe cultures that are outside Europe, so too is ‘Chinese’ an 
adjective that can travel the globe. Nonetheless, its origins stem from the 
Chinese empire.
The contributors to this volume are cognizant of the fact that ‘Chinese’ 
contains remnants of imperial times when ‘China’ was not only the cen-
tre of the world, but also ‘all under heaven’ (tianxia), a term that indicated 
the traditional Chinese view of the world: that the Chinese civilization 
was all there was in the universe. However, we are more concerned here 
with analysing current perceptions and realities. Mostly, we describe peo-
ple and things in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  We are also keenly 
aware that as well as qualifying people and things in China, the term ‘Chi-
nese’ can also describe people of the ‘national minorities’ and the Chinese 
diaspora, scattered around the world, and ideas and things that may or 
may not have come out of China. The ‘national minorities’ aside, the di-
versity of Chinese ethnicities sets the scene for discarding the notion of 
an essential and fi xed Chineseness. Debates about what it means to be 
Chinese have raged for decades. They continue right into the present 
time, and will no doubt intensify as the PRC and Taiwanese leaderships 
believe that it is more advantageous to govern a people with a more uni-
fi ed identity.  However, as William Jankowiak shows in Chapter 5, while 
the Chinese state would like its people to be more culturally centric and 
converge towards some Confucian norm, in reality, even the Han Chinese 
are composed of people with variant languages and habits. The notion 
of ethnic, and therefore ‘minority’, identity is a fl uid and contested one. 
Thus, again, ‘change’ provides the key to our discussions.
Often, people’s self-perceptions are transformed by social forces be-
yond their control. However, there are times when they actively want 
to adopt a different persona, for example by assuming the customs and 
appearances of foreign cultures. A recent article from the Washington Post 
about new housing developments in China entitled ‘Developers Build 
Ersatz European, American Communities for the New Middle Class’ 
articulates this phenomenon graphically:
The ding-dong from the neo-Gothic church next door signals
to Wu Yuqing that it’s time to wake up. On her way to the grocery 
store each day, she walks past the Cob Gate Fish & Chip shop and 
bronze statues of Winston Churchill, Florence Nightingale and 
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William Shakespeare. Tall men decked out in the red uniforms of the 
Queen’s Guard nod hello.
The place looks a lot like a small town on the Thames River, but 
Wu’s new home is actually in a suburb of Shanghai . . .
Shanghai’s plan is . . . [to build] . . . a ring of satellite developments 
modeled after different parts of Europe, including German, Czech, 
Spanish and Scandinavian districts, in addition to the one that looks 
like London, known as Thames Town.3
The writer of this article calls these new townships ‘ersatz’, cast-
ing doubt on the authenticity not only of the buildings, but by impli-
cation of the cultural affectations of the residents.  The article makes 
quite plain that the residents of these townships do not know anything 
about the European cultures that they aspire towards.  Nevertheless, it is 
legitimate to ask: are these townships Chinese or European? Clearly, the 
 article suggests they are Chinese, or fake Western as best. The word  ersatz 
implies that. Suppose these townships were full of pale  Englishmen, 
blonde Germans etc, living as they did in the old foreign concessions in 
 Shanghai? Would they be considered European or still Chinese?  That is 
to say, would these townships then be part of European or Chinese cul-
ture?  What we are asking here is: does it matter if a place that is situ-
ated in China looks European or American and wants to imitate those 
lifestyles? Are they then Western?  Or do they need white people living in 
them to be Western?
All the above questions can be asked with different referents.  When is 
Chinese culture Chinese?  In Mainland China?  What about Hong Kong 
or Taiwan?  Or, if we take the question even further, what about China-
towns in the West? There, we have had for nearly a hundred years many 
districts that are called Chinatowns. These so-called Chinatowns are 
usually populated by Chinese shops, restaurants, and more importantly 
ethnic Chinese. 
It is true that many older Chinese living in foreign countries be-
lieve that even though they live in the West – some having done so for 
generations – they are more knowledgeable about Chinese culture than 
those back in China. Of course, as Wang Gungwu shows in Chapter 6, 
there is a great variety of self-identities among the diasporic Chinese 
communities, and these identities also change over time, sometimes be-
cause of the environment in the host country, but more often because of 
the changing political situation in China itself. In addition, the claim by 
diasporic communities that they preserve the authentic home culture 
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while those back in the homeland have lost it is common not just among 
Chinese, but also among other migrant communities. For example, 
many young migrant women experience considerable confl ict with old-
er generations in their families who complain that the young have lost 
the moral codes of their home countries. In immigrant countries such 
as Australia, this migrant syndrome was once quite common among 
Greeks and Italians, until the older generation realized that their home-
lands had changed and had left them behind.  
The idea of Chinatown has always said more about an imagined 
 Chinese culture of the non-Chinese in the host countries than about 
the actual cultures in the Chinatowns. For example, Barrio Chino in 
Barcelona is an area in the inner city that was once the red light district, 
and was seen to be an area of sex, drugs and crime. They called it Barrio 
Chino because presumably the Chinese were thought to indulge in sex, 
drugs and crime. Such an Orientalist use of Chinese culture was also 
highly evident in Polanski’s movie Chinatown, starring Jack Nicholson 
and Faye Dunaway. As in Barcelona’s Barrio Chino, the Chinese are al-
most invisible in the movie Chinatown: the title only makes sense if we 
agree that anything associated with even the name Chinese must be 
imbued with immorality, homicide and inscrutability.
Of course, not all imagined Chinese cultures are evil and corrupt. 
The Chinatown in the Australian aboriginal township of Cherbourg is 
also an imagined space, and no Chinese person has ever lived there, but 
it seems that those who lay claim to it do so because one of the women 
in generations past might have married a Chinese, and one infl uential 
female elder in particular decided that they would defi ne themselves 
against the other inhabitants by holding on to this Chinese heritage, 
whether it was real or not. This was one way to counter the oppressive 
white domination that these communities suffered.4 It can be argued 
that this Chinatown has as much to do with Chinese culture as that in 
Polanski’s fi lm Chinatown, but can we therefore erase the ‘Chinese’ quali-
fi er in the term? Obviously, we can only answer in the affi rmative if we 
are perfectly clear what ‘Chinese’ means and deny all others the right to 
claim some idea or thing as Chinese. Failing this, ‘Chinese’ becomes just 
about anything that we want to make it. 
Nonetheless, some of the best minds in China in the last hundred years 
or so have been trying to devise ways of distilling what they consider to 
be the essence of ‘Chinese culture’ so that its good bits can be inherited 
and its rotten bits discarded. In the early twentieth century, for example, 
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thinkers like Zhang Binglin, Liu Shipei and those of the ‘ National 
 Essence’ School tried hard to recover the best of Chinese culture. Even 
in the most radical phases of Communist rule, some of the most intense 
controversies among intellectuals have been concerned with ways of 
defi ning the essence of Chinese culture, and when that is done, preserv-
ing it.  The most notable method devised for salvaging Chinese culture 
was proposed by Feng Youlan, whose ‘abstract inheritance method’ basi-
cally stated that, despite the fact that the ‘feudal dross’ of Confucianism 
should be repudiated and trashed, the essential goodness of Confucian 
humanism should be inherited in an abstract way so that the transition 
to a new Socialist society would not be too abrupt and the fi ne values of 
Chinese culture would not be forgotten.5 Thus, it is not only in relation 
to popular culture such as cooking and dating behaviour that arguments 
are put forward to ensure that ‘Chinese culture’ is continued.  Similar 
claims have been made even in the most abstract realms.
Outside the Mainland, these debates have been revived with a venge-
ance since China became more open to the outside world in the 1980s, 
with the revival of the so-called ‘New Confucian’ school of thought. This 
‘school’ was begun by philosophers such as Liang Shuming and Xiong 
Shili who even before 1949 had argued for the revival of Confucianism in 
China. Their versions of Confucianism were heavily diluted by Buddhist 
elements, so much so that Liang has been described as ‘the last Buddhist’ 
as well as the ‘last Confucian’.6 While Liang and Xiong are now said to 
be the fathers of the New Confucianism school, their conservative ideas 
simply had no way of gaining acceptance in the Mainland after 1949. 
Their message that Confucianism or Chinese tradition held the key to 
a correct way to live in the modern world continued to be advocated by 
those who left China and lived in Hong Kong and Taiwan in particular. 
In Chapter 7, Sor-hoon Tan describes the ways in which the ‘new’ Confu-
cian thought developed during the twentieth century.
On the Mainland itself, the so-called New Confucians were mostly 
ignored for some thirty years after China became Communist. It was 
only after the ‘Asian Economic Miracle’ and the opening up of China’s 
economy after the 1980s that Confucianism came back into vogue. A 
relatively obscure document titled ‘Declaration on Behalf of Chinese 
Culture Respectfully Announced to the People of the World’, which 
had been published in 1958, was resuscitated as the beginnings of the 
formation of a new school of thought. The 1958 document was penned 
by four of the most vocal writers outside China known for their regular 
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‘defence’ of what they perceived to be the ‘glories of traditional Chinese 
culture’: Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, Zhang Junmai and Tang Junyi. In 
fact, this document is not a systematic outline of any one philosophy as 
such; rather, it is an attempt by those who felt strongly about traditional 
Chinese philosophy to integrate it with a perceived modern and world 
culture.
As scholars who had fl ed China, the authors of the Declaration consid-
ered that China under Communism had lost its cultural heritage. Natu-
rally, these writers were all but ignored in China. However, in the last 
twenty or so years, the Mainland’s attitude towards traditional Chinese 
culture has changed dramatically.  ‘New Confucianism’ gained popular-
ity there and renowned philosophers who were considered New Con-
fucianists were invited to lecture at Peking University and other pres-
tigious institutions.  One of these visiting scholars was Tu Wei-ming, a 
professor from Harvard University. Tu Wei-ming’s most infl uential the-
sis concerning Chinese culture is succinctly summed up in his seminal 
essay: ‘Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center’.7 It is clear that the 
question of who has possession of Chinese culture has become of great 
interest to the tens of millions of ethnic Chinese who live outside China 
today.  There is something incongruous about the claim that the practi-
tioners of ‘real’ Chinese culture live not inside China, but abroad, espe-
cially at the apex of American thinking, Harvard.  Nonetheless, the point 
has been made and made quite persuasively.
In refusing to recognize the changes in China that were taking place 
around them, the New Confucians before 1949 could be said to have been 
in a state of denial. The New Culture Movement in the early decades of 
the twentieth century had all but made Confucianism the antithesis of 
modernity. The Communist regime continued on the anti-Confucian 
path throughout the 1950s and 1960s, so that by the Cultural Revolution 
decade all ‘old things’ were vehemently attacked. Most interestingly, the 
Gang of Four during the anti-Confucius campaign of 1974 wanted to re-
vive Legalism to replace Confucianism. Instead of wanting to be ‘mod-
ern’, they salvaged what they claimed to be indigenous Chinese in the 
philosophy of ancient thinkers such as the Legalists Xunzi and Hanfei. 
These classical philosophers were, as the Gang of Four rightly pointed 
out, at least indigenous Chinese. What the radicals did not emphasize 
was that Legalism was in fact an offshoot of Confucianism, and that the 
utilitarian Mozi and his followers were much more hostile to the Con-
fucians, making Moism an indigenous system that was philosophically 
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much more an antithesis to Confucianism than Legalism could claim to 
be. Nonetheless, casting aside the politics of the interpretations, and the 
harshness of some aspects of Legalism, surely Legalism or the pragmatic 
Moism would be a better route to an amalgam of Chinese and Western 
essences than the deceptive notions of ‘benevolent’ Confucian manage-
ment techniques that are being propagated now? This is deceptive be-
cause Confucius and past Confucian orthodoxy denigrated commerce, 
but the New Confucians seem quite happy to accommodate the ‘mod-
ern’ Confucius as a business consultant. Even more heretically, the self-
proclaimed hedonist Yu Dan interprets the Confucian Analects as a text 
on how to live a good life in the modern world. The populace, hungry for 
spiritual sustenance that is both ‘Chinese’ and hip, eagerly buy into this 
rendition, thereby making Yu Dan a new-style academic celebrity.8
Perhaps, in parallel to the term ‘postmodern’ that is now bandied 
about in parts of the world, we have a post-Chinese Chinese culture. It 
would be a political nonsense to talk about post-China.  But in terms of 
culture, using post-Chinese as a possessive adjective makes good sense. 
This postmodern post-Chinese idea is often expressed as trans-national 
Chineseness.  In fact, in discussions of arthouse Chinese fi lms, the trans-
national usage is standard.  There have been few fi lms since the Fifth 
Generation movie directors that could be truly said to be purely Chinese, 
since most are global productions. And the competition is also for inter-
national prizes. Chris Berry in Chapter 15 traces the fi lm industry from 
its beginnings as a Western import early last century to its  emergence 
as a global phenomenon; interestingly, he also demonstrates that with 
the emergence of the Sixth Generation directors, the industry has 
 fragmented within China itself. As with every other aspect of Chinese 
culture, the fi lmic form is in a state of fl ux.  The same is true for other 
art forms such as music and painting. Colin Mackerras in Chapter 13 and 
David Clarke in Chapter 14 show how the performing and visual arts 
have undergone dramatic changes due to the interplay of native tradi-
tions and traditions from without, including European and Soviet theo-
ries and practices. The result of all this intermingling tells much about 
the globalization of culture, and these chapters on sight and sound are 
excellent demonstrations of this process.
In China at present, classical European music is probably as popular 
and performed as frequently as it is in any country in Europe. The degree 
to which artistic pursuits that are considered ‘modern’ (and often West-
ern) are nurtured ensures that whatever is produced or admired there 
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are fusions of many different styles, often with elements from ethnic 
Chinese artists working abroad as well. In the same way, Chinese litera-
ture in the twentieth century went through so many transformations 
due to infl uences from the outside world that to talk about a Chinese lit-
erature needs many qualifi cations. Thus, the history of modern Chinese 
literature that I co-authored is awkwardly titled The Literature of China in 
the Twentieth Century rather than simply ‘Modern Chinese Literature’ to 
delimit it temporally and spatially and distinguish it from all other lit-
eratures that are written in the Chinese language or are Chinese in con-
tent.9 Of course, Chinese literature, even when it refers to that written 
in Mainland China, has numerous strands, and here again, change is the 
defi ning feature, as Charles Laughlin and Michel Hockx show in their 
chapters (Chapters 11 and 12) on the complexities of the noisy revolution-
ary and inward-looking involutionary literary traditions. If we consider 
the literature by Chinese diasporic writers about life in foreign lands in 
non-Chinese languages as part of the Chinese literary scene, the notion 
of post-Chinese is even more irresistible.
Culture
The word ‘culture’ is, in different ways, as complicated as ‘Chinese’. 
In Chinese, the term ‘culture’ (wenhua) literally implies a process of 
transformation by wen, or writing. Thus ‘culture’ invokes writing. Wen 
originally came from the scratches made on ancient divination objects 
such as bones and tortoise shells, and was therefore a human attempt 
to  reveal thought patterns in concrete form. It was also the precursor 
to writing, with its function of communicating and categorizing the 
universe. Certainly, it captures the idea of people in the priestly or writ-
ing classes making sense of the world. Traditionally, as Zong-qi Cai 
 observes, wen denotes many things, including ‘royal posthumous titles, 
ritual objects, rites and music, norms and statutes; dignifi ed deport-
ment, the polite arts, graphic cosmic symbols, eloquent speech, writ-
ing, rhymed writing, and belles-lettres’.10 In short, wen denotes lofty 
symbols and writing. It still has these connotations today. Colloquially, 
to say that somebody has culture (you wenhua) means that they have an 
education and can write. The verbalizing particle hua in wenhua thus 
indicates the transformative effect of culture. Through cultivation, wen-
hua in theory can be achieved by all who aspire to it so that, through it, 
a cultured person is changed. 
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While change is implicit in the notion of wenhua, the change, or im-
provement, that it engenders has always been intimately linked to that 
which is mostly transcribed, including language, literature, religion and 
philosophy. In Chinese, more than in most other languages, the writing 
system was the site of intense struggles throughout the twentieth centu-
ry. This is not surprising, since having writing skills is the prerequisite to 
having culture in the ordinary understanding of the word ‘culture’, since 
‘wen’, or writing, is literally part of the meaning of culture. As Ping Chen 
shows in Chapter 10, the struggle waged around the writing system is 
not just linguistic, but highly political. Diffi culty in mastering language 
leads to debates about simplifying it, so that it is made more available 
to more people. Coupled with simplifi cation, the more radical proposal 
argues for the advantages of Romanization and Pinyin, so that the mem-
orization of thousands of characters is rendered unnecessary. While com-
puters and the Internet have to a certain extent democratized the written 
language, ‘culture’ in Chinese retains its connotations of ‘high culture’. 
In the anglophone world, the notion of a ‘high culture’ is perhaps 
best expressed by Matthew Arnold (1822–88), who claimed that to have 
culture is to ‘know the best that has been said and thought in the world’.11 
This elitist position is concise, but not very precise. To start with, what 
is best is not fi xed and is thus highly contentious. More importantly, it 
was promoted at a time of empire, when Britannia ruled the waves. So, 
presumably, the best came out of Britain, and Arnold did not hesitate to 
proclaim this belief. By contrast, China in the nineteenth century was 
experiencing some of the worst moments in its history. Chinese culture 
then would not have been something that many people would have con-
sidered to be the best. More likely, in England, in the pursuit of truth and 
beauty, most would have chosen the Keatsian fancies of classical Greece.
While the colonial age in the nineteenth century gave the impres-
sion that European culture represented the most advanced form of 
civilization, the two World Wars shook the complacency of many Euro-
peans. Those wars in concert with the anti-colonialist movements that 
followed helped lead to changes in attitudes towards culture. In the sec-
ond half of the century, academia in the West began to argue for less lofty 
ideas and manifestations of human society, best exemplifi ed by Raymond 
Williams’ 1958 essay ‘Culture is Ordinary’.12 Such sentiments had a coun-
terpart in China. The Maoist emphasis on creating a popular/peasant 
culture that ‘served the people’ was to have a lasting impact on how 
wenhua is understood. In both the West and China, the closing decades of 
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the twentieth century were a time when ‘Cultural Studies’ began to take 
hold in universities, and, as well as ‘subaltern’ cultural items, non-written 
everyday objects such as cinema, television, kungfu and sex became 
prime areas of research into ‘culture’. Thus, despite the fact that academ-
ics were getting involved in this new understanding of culture, ‘wenhua’ 
was becoming less refi ned and elevated and more mass-based. More im-
portantly, wenhua no longer needed to be based on wen, or the written.
But while this conception of culture is more democratic, it is also 
more anarchic. What is not culture? How individualistic can one go? 
When do I know that ‘my culture’ is the same as ‘our culture’? This ques-
tion is especially important for migrant societies such as Australia. In an 
age of globalization, it has also become increasingly important for other 
countries, including China. Thus, in the late twentieth century, the de-
cline of the canons also brought consequences of uncertainty in literary 
and artistic fi elds. For rapidly developing countries such as China in par-
ticular, ‘culture’ is often appropriated by politicians and educationalists, 
who advocate maintaining and perpetuating culture as a social cohesive, 
and using it to stabilize societies through a process of mutual recogni-
tion of shared values.
Treating culture as synonymous with sets of meanings that distin-
guish groups from each other helps to create in-groups and out-groups. 
As such, it was effectively harnessed throughout twentieth-century 
China to further nationalist goals. Chinese culture has drifted away from 
its original meaning of wenhua as an elevated text-based phenomenon 
based in China, to one which can be used by people who reside not just 
on the Chinese Mainland but throughout the world. Even so, the claim 
to some sort of superior essence is still quite pronounced, so that my cul-
ture is somehow wenhua while your (referring to anyone who is not ‘Chi-
nese’) culture can be seen as barbaric.
Wen refers not just to literary or cultural accomplishments. The fun-
damental utility of ‘wen’ rests on its reference to power. Having wen in 
the past referred to those who had passed the civil service examinations. 
Thus, the wenren, or the scholar-gentry, which in China has reproduced 
itself through the civil service examination system for centuries, was 
clearly the controlling class. Even now, ‘you wenhua’ generally refers to 
those who have fi nished a certain amount of formal education, normal-
ly senior secondary school. They usually have steady jobs and a regular 
income, such as teachers or bureaucrats who perpetuate social norms. 
These social norms, of course, were the traditionally Confucian ‘culture’ 
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that in the twentieth century were becoming much more unstable and 
in fl ux. Traditionally, the wenren could only be men, since men were the 
only people allowed to sit for the civil service examinations that enabled 
them to become ‘cultured’. However, in the twentieth century, gender 
boundaries were progressively being transformed, and Harriet Evans’ 
discussion in Chapter 4 details the many intricacies associated with the 
breaking down of such boundaries.
In fact, the twentieth century, in our terms the period of modern 
Chinese culture, shows that this culture has become the site of intense 
struggle, with everyone claiming ownership of it, and in the process 
changing its meaning and content. Of course, there has been widespread 
agreement that Chinese culture has certain essential general ingredi-
ents, and both Feng Youlan’s ‘abstract inheritance method’ effort and 
those of the New Confucians were attempts to salvage the ‘abstract’ and 
‘general’ elements of this culture. Unfortunately, when they say ‘Chinese 
culture’, these theoreticians often imply more ‘elevated’ and conser-
vative values.  The argument for some essential Chineseness that rests 
on Chinese culture parallels the ‘Asian values’ debate that was fashion-
able in the 1980s and 1990s. Ultimately this was about eulogizing con-
ventional practices such as treasuring family ties, respecting the old, 
valuing formal education and honouring hard work – practices that are 
found in most societies. Thus, no matter how we interpret modern Chi-
nese culture, the only safe statement we can make about it is that it is 
vague and forever changing. Furthermore, the globalization process as 
a catalyst for change has not slowed down in the new millennium, but 
has become more intense than ever before. This will mean that Chinese 
culture will transform even more quickly as time progresses, and trying 
to stabilize its ‘essence’ for preservation will become more diffi cult. Its 
‘essence’ has in fact become an ingredient for new fusions of different 
cultures.
This is not to say that local communities and cultures do not  defi ne 
individuals. Indeed, Daniel Overmyer in Chapter 9 emphasizes the over-
riding importance of local traditions of ritual and belief as the major 
form of Chinese religion. In many respects, these local cultures have long 
been the foundation of what it means to be Chinese for the majority of the 
population.  When asked where they are from, people generally  respond 
by naming their ancestral community, and, by  implication, all the tradi-
tions it represents. Notwithstanding this important qualifi cation, Over-
myer does provide an overview of the beliefs and rituals of the major 
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religions such as Daoism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam in China, 
showing how they have been interacting and infl uencing life in China 
for millennia, and that in the twentieth century these interactions have 
become even more intense.  The move towards globalization means that 
Chinese culture is something that is evolving almost in the way that was 
aptly summarized by Tan Sitong, who in 1896 attempted to integrate 
Confucianism, Christianity and Buddhism. Tan Sitong was executed 
two years later for his political activism in the promotion of heterodoxy, 
but when he proclaimed that ‘the founders of the three religions [Chris-
tianity, Confucianism and Buddhism] are all one. When I worship one, 
I worship them all’,13 he was already one step ahead of those such as the 
New Confucianist Liang Shuming and the Communist radical Chen 
Duxiu who fi ercely argued about the merits of Eastern and Western cul-
tures a couple of decades later. 
Ultimately, Chinese culture should describe how the Chinese people 
live and play as well as how they think. Wenhua is more than wen. In their 
play, the Chinese have also been keen to be part of the world community, 
and not just part of, but to lead in this arena as well. The time and effort 
invested in hosting the Olympic Games is but the most conspicuous ex-
ample of this. As Susan Brownell shows in Chapter 17, this event is the 
culmination of decades of China’s endeavours to be recognized as a world 
leader by other countries. The wish to achieve leadership status is not 
confi ned to the sporting arena, though it is of paramount importance in 
terms of China’s international relations. Other aspects of Chinese physi-
cal culture such as martial arts are also gaining popularity abroad. Mean-
while, within China, Western forms of physical activity such as ballroom 
dancing are promoted as a means to physical and mental health.
Of course, sport is but one dimension of Chinese culture that has 
changed and is changing. Every other aspect of Chinese culture is also 
undergoing dramatic transformations. Furthermore, every other as-
pect of Chinese culture is becoming globalized. By taking the end of the 
nineteenth century as the beginning of modern culture and the whole 
of the twentieth century as the time frame that we have defi ned as mod-
ern China in terms of culture, therefore, the book should neatly bring 
the end back to the beginning, when the biggest concern was how to be 
both Chinese and a citizen of the world. In fact, now the case for taking 
all thoughts and practices as ‘Chinese cultures’ is even more pertinent, 
as we have truly multi-cultural cultural forms such as fi lms and the 
Internet that bind the world even more closely together.  For these forms 
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are literally created trans-culturally, producing outcomes that are recog-
nizably Chinese but also global.
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